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To the Editor: We report fi ndings 
from a household-based study on 
the protective effects of vaccination 
against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among 
Japanese children. In Japan, prioritized 
vaccination started in October 2009, 
focusing on health care workers, 
pregnant women, persons with 
underlying diseases, and children 1–9 
years of age. Only nonadjuvant split 
vaccines (inactivated) produced by 4 
manufacturers (Denka Seiken, Tokyo, 
Japan; Kaketsuken, Kumamoto-shi, 
Japan; Kitasato, Tokyo, Japan; and 
Biken, Suita-shi, Japan) were used by 
the end of January 2010 (1). Because 
the protective effects of vaccination 
at the individual level are best 
measured by household data (2), we 
conducted a retrospective household 
survey involving 1,614 nonrandomly 
sampled households (i.e., based on 
area sampling of households across 
Japan, according to the regional 
population size, with a total of 6,356 
household members), in which the 
earliest cases were diagnosed from 
October 2009 to mid-February 2010. 
Our study aimed to assess vaccine-
induced reductions in susceptibility 
and infectiousness among children by 
using the household secondary attack 
rate.
Infl uenza cases were defi ned 
as confi rmed cases (i.e., diagnosed 
by real-time PCR) or infl uenza-like 
illness (ILI) cases (i.e., in febrile 
patients [>37.5°C] with cough and/
or sore throat). The cases had to 
meet the following inclusion criteria 
for analyses: 1) index case-patient 
and exposed persons in households 
were healthy children 1–9 years of 
age (households with <2 children 
were excluded), because age-specifi c 
susceptibility and infectiousness can 
greatly infl uence the frequency of 
household transmission (3–6); b) all 
exposed persons shared the same 
household with index case-patients for 
at least 1 of 7 days after illness onset 
of the index case-patient; c) index 
case-patient did not receive treatment 
with antiviral agents (e.g., zanamivir 
or oseltamivir) within 2 days after 
illness onset; d) time interval from 
illness onset of the index case-patient 
to that of subsequent case-patients 
was <7 days (7,8); and e) vaccinated 
persons received their fi rst vaccination 
>28 days before illness onset (if index 
case-patient) or exposure (if not index 
case- patient).
In total, 251 children met the 
above criteria, comprising 109 index 
case-patients and 133 unvaccinated 
and 9 vaccinated exposed persons. 
The mean age was 6.4 ± 2.1 SD years. 
Among the 251 children, 15 (6.0%) 
had been vaccinated, and 169 (67.3%) 
had received a diagnosis of infl uenza. 
Confi rmed cases accounted for 17.8% 
(30/169) of cases; 21 patients were 
the index case-patients in individual 
households. The mean age of patients 
with confi rmed diagnoses was 6.5 
± 2.0 SD years and did not differ 
signifi cantly from the ILI patients.
Let SARij represent the household 
secondary attack rate (SAR) with 
vaccination statuses of the index 
patient j and exposed persons i (where 
i or j is 0 or 1 for unvaccinated or 
vaccinated, respectively), and let b 
represent both groups. Among 133 
exposed unvaccinated children, ILI 
developed in 59, yielding an SAR0b of 
44.4%. Among 9 exposed vaccinated 
children, ILI developed in 1 child, 
yielding an SAR1b of 11.1%. The 
difference between these SARs was 
marginally signifi cant (p = 0.08 by 
Fisher exact test), and the susceptibility 
reduction was 1 – SAR1b/SAR0b = 
75.0% (95% confi dence interval [CI] 
–60.5% to 96.1%). Considering only 
exposures caused by unvaccinated fi rst 
patients, SAR00 and SAR10 were 44.7% 
(59/132) and 0% (0/4), respectively. 
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When the fi rst patients with ILI in 
households were unvaccinated, ILI 
was observed in 59 of 136 children, 
yielding an SARb0 of 43.4%. Among 
6 exposures caused by vaccinated fi rst 
patients, ILI developed in 1 person, 
yielding an SARb1 of 16.7%. Although 
not signifi cant (p = 0.40), the reduction 
in infectiousness by vaccination was 
estimated to be 1 – SARb1/SARb0 = 
61.6% (95% CI –132.3% to 93.6%). 
The SAR01 was 0% (i.e., 1 exposure 
to an unvaccinated person caused by 
a vaccinated fi rst patient did not result 
in infl uenza). Limiting the defi nition 
of infl uenza to confi rmed cases, all 8 
exposures to vaccinated persons did 
not result in infl uenza, and SAR0b 
and SAR1b were 10.8% and 0%, 
respectively. Similarly, all 5 exposures 
caused by vaccinated fi rst patients 
did not result in confi rmed cases, and 
SARb0 and SARb1 were 10.5% and 0%, 
respectively.
Although the CIs of the estimates 
included zero because of the small 
sample size, the expected reductions 
in susceptibility and infectiousness 
were 75.0% and 61.6%, respectively, 
which is consistent with fi ndings from 
a meta-analysis of vaccine effi cacy 
against seasonal infl uenza (9). Two 
limitations must be noted, namely, 
estimates based on nonrandom 
samples and a case defi nition that 
relied on symptoms of case-patients. 
The former point cannot be explicitly 
addressed by a retrospective study 
design, but we enforced strict 
inclusion criteria for analyses and 
limited our study to healthy children. 
Accounting for the latter point 
(e.g., serologic diagnosis to capture 
symptomatic and asymptomatic cases) 
could yield slightly higher estimates 
than ours, provided that vaccination 
reduces the probability of clinical 
illness if infection occurs. Thus, 
despite these limitations and a critical 
need for further studies that include 
estimations of effectiveness (10), our 
results provide insight into the effects 
of vaccination in reducing risks for 
infection and clinical attack among 
children exposed to pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus in their households.
The work of H.N. was supported by 
the Japan Science and Technology Agency 
Precursory Research for Embryonic 
Science and Technology program. O.H. 
received a Health and Labour Sciences 
Research Grant (20-005-OH) from the 




Author affi liations: Japan Science and 
Technology Agency, Saitama, Japan (H. 
Nishiura); University of Utrecht, Utrecht, 
the Netherlands (H. Nishiura); and Tohoku 
University Graduate School of Medicine, 
Sendai, Japan (H. Oshitani)
DOI: 10.3201/eid1704.100525
References
  1.  Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 
Japan. Vaccination against pandemic 
infl uenza(A/H1N1). 2009 [cited 2010 Mar 
10]. http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/top-
ics/infl uenza_a/index.html 
  2.  Halloran ME, Longini IM, Struchiner CJ. 
Design and analysis of vaccine studies. 
New York: Springer; 2010.
  3.  Longini IM, Koopman JS, Haber M, Cot-
sonis GA. Statistical inference for infec-
tious diseases. Risk-specifi c household 
and community transmission parameters. 
Am J Epidemiol. 1988;128:845–59.
  4.  Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchemez S, 
Hanage WP, Van Kerkhove MD, Holling-
worth TD, et al. Pandemic potential of a 
strain of infl uenza A (H1N1): early fi nd-
ings. Science. 2009;324:1557–61. DOI: 
10.1126/science.1176062
  5.  Nishiura H, Chowell G, Safan M, Castillo-
Chavez C. Pros and cons of estimating the 
reproduction number from early epidemic 
growth rate of infl uenza A (H1N1) 2009. 
Theor Biol Med Model. 2010;7:1. DOI: 
10.1186/1742-4682-7-1
  6. Itoh Y, Shinya K, Kiso M, Watanabe T, 
Sakoda Y, Hatta M, et al. In vitro and 
in vivo characterization of new swine-
origin H1N1 infl uenza viruses. Nature. 
2009;460:1021–5.
  7.  Cauchemez S, Donnelly CA, Reed C, 
Ghani AC, Fraser C, Kent CK, et al. 
Household transmission of 2009 pandem-
ic infl uenza A (H1N1) virus in the United 
States. N Engl J Med. 2009;361:2619–27. 
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa0905498
  8.  Morgan OW, Parks S, Shim T, Blevins PA, 
Lucas PM, Sanchez R, et al. Household 
transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
San Antonio, Texas, USA, April–May 
2009. Emerg Infect Dis. 2010;16:631–7.
  9.  Basta NE, Halloran ME, Matrajt L, 
Longini IM. Estimating infl uenza vac-
cine effi cacy from challenge and commu-
nity-based study data. Am J Epidemiol. 
2008;168:1343–52. DOI: 10.1093/aje/
kwn259
10.  Smith S, Demicheli V, Di Pietrantonj C, 
Harnden AR, Jefferson T, Matheson NJ, 
et al. Vaccines for preventing infl uenza in 
healthy children. Cochrane Database Syst 
Rev. 2006;(1):CD004879.
Address for correspondence: Hiroshi Nishiura, 
University of Utrecht, Yalelaan 7, Utrecht, 3584 
CL, the Netherlands; email: nishiura@hku.hk
Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Virus in 
3 Wildlife Species, 
San Diego, 
California, USA
To the Editor: The infl uenza A 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus rapidly 
created a global pandemic among 
humans and also appears to have strong 
infectivity for a broad range of animal 
species (1–3). The virus has been 
found repeatedly in swine and has been 
detected in a dog, cats, turkeys, and 
domestic ferrets and in nondomestic 
animals, including skunks, cheetahs, 
and giant anteaters (2–4). In some 
cases, animal-to-animal transmission 
may have occurred, raising concern 
about the development of new wildlife 
reservoirs (2).
In 2009, the fi rst recognized 
occurrence of pandemic (H1N1) 
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